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There are many reasons for insuﬃcient progress in reducing hunger and
undernutrition. One of these is a “lack of political will” or political pri-
oritisation.
[Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2012, p. 22.]
In recent years, the global hunger and nutrition community
has increasingly come to view political commitment as an
essential ingredient for pushing food and nutrition security
higher up public policy agendas (FAO, IFAD, & WFP,
2013, 2014; Foresight, 2011; Gillespie, Haddad, Mannar,
Menon, & Nisbett, 2013; IFPRI, 2014; te Lintelo, Haddad,
Leavy, & Lakshman, 2014; te Lintelo, Haddad, Leavy,
Masset, & Stanley, 2011). In response, commitment metrics
and scorecard tools to assess levels of political commitment
have proliferated. They enhance accountability of govern-
ments, donors, civil society, and the private sector organiza-
tions for actions addressing hunger and nutrition.
International organizations and aid donors also use these tools
to make decisions on funding and programmatic action.
Examples of these metrics include the World Health Organiza-
tion’s (WHO) nutrition landscape analyses (Engesveen,
Nishida, Prudhon, & Shrimpton, 2009), the Hunger Free
scorecard (ActionAid, 2009, 2010), the Hunger Reduction
Commitment Index (te Lintelo, Haddad, Lakshman, &
Gatellier, 2014; te Lintelo et al., 2011); the Nutrition Barome-
ter (Save the Children & World Vision International, 2012);
the Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index (te Lintelo,
Haddad, Lakshman, & Gatellier, 2013, 2014); the Political
Commitment Rapid Assessment Tool (Fox, Balarajan,
Cheng, & Reich, 2015) and the Global Nutrition Report’s
review of Nutrition 4 Growth Summit commitments (IFPRI,
2014).
These metrics have focused on operationalizing the concept
of political commitment to enable its measurement. Yet many
inadvertently conﬂate commitment to address food security
with commitment to tackle nutrition security; and commit-
ment to ﬁght hunger with commitment to combat undernutri-
tion. This conﬂation is also common in the policy and
academic literature (World Bank, 2006) and in dominant280narratives on nutrition in development (Nisbett, Gillespie,
Haddad, & Harris, 2014). Because the concepts of food secu-
rity and nutrition security are only partially overlapping, we
hypothesize that government commitment to hunger reduction
is empirically diﬀerent from government commitment to
reducing undernutrition. This study accordingly builds on
research that has used secondary data to demonstrate that
developing countries often have divergent strengths of com-
mitment to hunger reduction and to nutrition (te Lintelo,
Haddad, Lakshman et al., 2014; te Lintelo et al., 2013). We
review the literature to synthesize a set of nine political com-
mitment indicators; construct a survey instrument; and collect
primary data in ﬁve high-burden countries (Bangladesh,
Malawi, Nepal, Tanzania, and Zambia) to ascertain whether
government commitment to hunger is the same as commit-
ment to nutrition.
We present two key ﬁndings. Firstly, our evidence shows
that hunger and nutrition commitment are not the same.
Empirically, hunger reduction commitment exceeds nutrition
commitment in Malawi, Bangladesh, Tanzania, and Zambia,
and the reverse is the case in Nepal. We thus aﬃrm our
hypothesis that government commitment to hunger reduction
does not equate with commitment to nutrition. This matters
because metrics that conﬂate hunger and undernutrition risk
misinforming government and donor policy and maintain his-
torically inadequate prioritization of non-food aspects of mal-
nutrition (Heaver, 2005). This in turn imperils achieving key
global or regional nutrition targets on stunting such as set
out in the African Union Malabo Declaration 2014 (to achieve
10% stunting levels by 2025), or by the World Health Assem-
bly (a 40% reduction of the global number of stunted children
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rics, which are gaining in popularity, must be sensitive to these
diﬀerences in order to better guide public policy and program-
matic action.
Our second main ﬁnding is that the survey instrument devel-
oped for this study is suﬃciently sensitive to record divergent
performances on nine commitment indicators within each
country. Accordingly the instrument could have diagnostic
value in assisting donors, civil society leaders, and nutrition
champions to assess in which areas commitment is in need
of strengthening, and in which areas further strengthening
may not be a priority. We discuss what kind of intervention
strategy could improve nutrition commitment.
Following this introduction, Section 2 provides a brief over-
view of the current status of hunger and undernutrition as glo-
bal development problems and discusses some important
conceptual diﬀerences that need to be reﬂected in political
commitment metrics. This is followed in Section 3 by a synthe-
sis of the literature to identify nine key political commitment
indicators that inform the research instrument employed in
this study. Section 4 presents the research methodology and
the research instrument. Section 5 presents ﬁndings, followed
by a discussion (Section 6) and conclusions (Section 7).2. HUNGER AND UNDERNUTRITION AS A GLOBAL
PROBLEM
Hunger and undernutrition are among the most persistent
global development challenges. Global numbers of undernour-
ished people remain very high despite some improvements
since the 1990s (Black et al., 2013). In 2012–14, 805 million
people (around one in eight people in the world) were esti-
mated to be suﬀering from chronic hunger and regularly not
getting enough food to conduct an active life (FAO, IFAD,
& WFP, 2013). Just as there are multiple manifestations of
hunger and undernutrition, so there are a number of diﬀerent
anthropometric measures, the most common of which are
stunting (a measure of chronic undernutrition), wasting (acute
undernutrition), and underweight (an amalgam of the two).
Globally, one quarter of children aged under ﬁve are stunted
(an estimated 162 million in 2012); 15% are underweight;
and 8% are wasted (UNICEF, 2014). At regional level these
statistics can be even more alarming. Many countries in Africa
still report high or very high child stunting prevalence rates, of
30% or more. The worst-aﬀected countries are concentrated in
Eastern Africa and the Sahel. A few countries in South Asia
also report stunting rates of up to 50% (FAO, IFAD, &
WFP, 2013). The rate of stunting among children under ﬁve
in South Asia is a staggering 32%, while one in six (16%) chil-
dren in the region suﬀer from wasting (UNICEF, 2014). In
2012, nearly 70% of the world’s wasted children lived in Asia
and the condition exposes these children to a markedly
increased risk of death. Globally, undernutrition contributed
to 45%, or 3.1 million deaths, of children under ﬁve in 2011
(Black et al., 2013), and is both a manifestation and an inter-
generational driving mechanism of poverty (Nisbett et al.,
2014).
Notwithstanding the routine measurement of hunger and
nutrition outcomes by governments and international organi-
zations, deﬁnitions, conceptual explication, and accompany-
ing measurement instruments for key terms have rarely been
static over the last three decades (CFS, 2012; FAO, IFAD,
& WFP, 2013, 2014; Foresight, 2011; Jarosz, 2011). This can
be illustrated by comparison of two leading analytical reports
on hunger and undernutrition: the synthesis report on EndingHunger of the Foresight Project on Global Food and Farming
Futures (2011) and FAO, IFAD, and WFP’s (2014) annual
State of Food Insecurity report. Foresight (2011) oﬀers a sub-
tle analysis of the overlapping nature of hunger, food insecu-
rity, and undernutrition. It shows that hunger may occur in
the presence as well as in the absence of undernutrition. Like-
wise, undernutrition may occur without people suﬀering from
chronic hunger. Tellingly, neither report oﬀers a deﬁnition of
hunger, similar conceptualizations of undernutrition, 1 and
subtly diﬀerent conceptualisations of food insecurity. FAO
deﬁnes food insecurity as “A situation that exists when people
lack secure access to suﬃcient amounts of safe and nutritious
food for normal growth and development and an active and
healthy life” (FAO, IFAD, & WFP, 2014, p. 50). Here, food
insecurity entails a realized outcome. In contrast, Foresight
posits food insecurity both as an actual as well as a potential
outcome by including situations where people have “suﬃcient
access to food today, but [are] at risk of loss in the future”
(Foresight, 2011, pp. 3–4).
Furthermore, Foresight (2011, p. 4) notes that while “there
is no speciﬁc measure of hunger” it “tends to be equated with
FAO’s “undernourishment” measure”, which itself is used as
an indicator for food insecurity. Indeed, the FAO report
speciﬁcally considers hunger as “being synonymous with
chronic undernourishment”, which is “a state, lasting for at
least one year, of inability to acquire enough food, deﬁned
as a level of food intake insuﬃcient to meet dietary energy
requirements” (FAO, IFAD, & WFP, 2014, p.50).
Despite the above, there is at least basic agreement about
the distinction between food security and nutrition security.
As nutrition has risen up international development agendas
over the last decade, thanks to major eﬀorts by, among others,
the Lancet Series (Bhutta et al., 2008), the Scaling Up Nutri-
tion movement and the recent Global Nutrition Report
(IFPRI, 2014), a consensus has emerged that (actualized) food
insecurity and hunger have food-based causes, whereas under-
nutrition is driven by food as well as non-food causes, includ-
ing care, hygiene, and health (e.g., CFS, 2011; FAO, IFAD, &
WFP, 2014; World Bank, 2006). 2 Accordingly, FAO has
adopted the concept of nutrition security that includes but
“diﬀers from food security in that it also considers the aspects
of adequate caring practices, health, and hygiene in addition
to dietary adequacy” (FAO, IFAD, & WFP, 2014, p.50).
Critically, the common distinction between food and
non-food causes enables this paper to investigate whether
commitment to tackling hunger (as an outcome of food
causes) equates to the commitment to addressing nutrition
(as an outcome of food and non-food causes). In order to
do so, the next section explores the concept of political com-
mitment.3. OPERATIONALIZING POLITICAL COMMITMENT
“Political commitment” is often considered synonymous
with “political will” 3and has been part of mainstream devel-
opment policy discourses for at least two decades. Debates in
the 1990s and early 2000s considered political commitment
“development’s latest holy grail” (McCourt, 2003, p. 1015)
and a key factor in explaining the outcomes of governance
(e.g., Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000) and macroeconomic reforms (e.g.,
McCourt, 2003; Morrissey, 1995). Responses to the 2007–08
global food price crisis also highlighted the role of political
commitment. The Irish Hunger Task Force. (2008, p. 23)
noted: “Addressing hunger. . . ultimately is a matter of politi-
cal priorities”, and FAO (2012) identiﬁed political commit-
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ing hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition.
Political scientists have an ambivalent take on the concept
of political commitment. “Standing at the crossroads of poli-
tics and policy” (Post, Raile, & Raile, 2010, p. 654), political
commitment is variously described as complicated and multi-
dimensional (Goldberg, Fox, Gore, & Ba¨rnighausen, 2012), a
“classic black box” (McCourt, 2003, p. 1016), and the “slip-
periest concept in the policy lexicon” that is “never deﬁned
except by its absence” (Hammergren, 1998, p. 12). The con-
cept is routinely used in a rhetorical, catch-all manner
(Thomas & Grindle, 1990, p. 1164), using post hoc circular
logic (Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000) to explain both failure and success
of public policy interventions. While this plasticity ensures
commitment to remain an important part of the vocabulary
of political leaders, various authors have attempted to deﬁne 4
and unpack the concept to facilitate empirical analysis (e.g.,
Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000; Goldberg et al., 2012; McCourt, 2003;
Morrissey, 1995; Post et al., 2010; Shiﬀman, 2007; Shiﬀman
& Smith, 2007). These analyses have focused on two types
of questions. Firstly, political economy approaches investigate
the context within which political commitment emerges, seek-
ing to explain why political commitment emerges or fails to
emerge, often at national government level. Examples of these
relating to hunger and nutrition include Gillespie et al., 2013;
Mejia-Acosta & Fanzo, 2012; Mejia Acosta & Haddad, 2014;
Nisbett et al., 2014; Pelletier et al., 2012 and Shiﬀman, 2007.
Key explanatory factors for commitment identiﬁed by these
studies include the structure of the polity and policy subsys-
tems; ideas; the characteristics of the actors and their power;
and the features of the policy issue at stake. 5 While some
cross-country studies record common features, typically,
in-depth political economy analyses focus on few cases within
a country, as comparison across diverse contexts is highly
complex. Theorization of why and how contextual factors cau-
sally shape commitment has hence been limited (Brinkerhoﬀ,
2000; Post et al., 2010).
This paper is however concerned with the second type of
question: what does political commitment look like? How do
we know it is there or not? Generally, analyses of political
commitment underline revealed preferences, i.e., when intent
is acted upon, because it is often impossible to divine—
let alone measure—latent intent (Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000;
Morrissey, 1995; Post et al., 2010). Political commitment
should hence not be seen as separate from, or prior to, action
on the ground.
We employ and adjust Brinkerhoﬀ’s (2000, p. 242) working
deﬁnition of political commitment as: the intent and sustained
actions over time by societal actors to achieve the objective of
reducing and eliminating the manifestations and causes of
hunger and undernutrition. Commitment could be manifested
by elected or appointed leaders and public agency senior oﬃ-
cials (Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000, p. 242). Commitment indicators hence
need to be sensitive to what such actors say, what they do and
what they do not do in terms of material, legal, and ﬁnancial
eﬀorts (The Policy Project, 2000). FAO (2012, p. 22) thus
notes that government political commitment to reduce hunger
and undernutrition would be shown by purposeful and deci-
sive public action, through public policies and programmes,
public spending, and legislation. Various commitment score-
cards and metrics have recently attempted assessing exactly
this. WHO nutrition landscape analyses (e.g., Engesveen
et al., 2009) and Scaling Up Nutrition proﬁles (SUN, 2013)
summarize the presence of particular nutrition governance fea-
tures within countries. Other tools actively compare countries,
such as the Hunger Reduction Commitment Index (HRCI) (teLintelo, Haddad, Leavy e al., 2014; te Lintelo et al., 2011), and
oﬀshoots including a Nutrition Barometer scorecard (Save the
Children, & World Vision International, 2012), the Hunger
And Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI) (te Lintelo
et al., 2013; te Lintelo, Haddad, Lakshman et al., 2014), and
the Global Nutrition Report (IFPRI, 2014). Typically, these
metrics employ secondary data on policy, legal and ﬁnancial
commitment indicators to compare, score, and rank coun-
tries. 6 However, governments do not routinely collect and
publish data on nine key commitment indicators identiﬁed in
the literature: “explicitness”; “irrevocability”; “voluntariness”;
“publicness”; “mobilising support”; “continuity and capac-
ity”; “analytical rigour”; “redible incentives”, and “implemen-
tation”.
For McCourt (2003), political commitment is strong to the
extent that it is explicit, irrevocable, voluntary, and public.
“Publicness” is about citizens’ physical and online access
and the ability to scrutinize public policies. It is also about
whether political and policy elites publicly state their support
for, and set out what kind of priority they give to, a policy
agenda (Heaver, 2005; Johnson & Wasty, 1993; McCourt,
2003; Post et al., 2010; Shiﬀman & Smith, 2007). Public state-
ments of policy preferences need to be read in context. They
can be acts of symbolic gesturing. Pelletier et al. (2012) ﬁnd
that Peruvian, Bolivian, and Guatemalan political leaders
publicly speak out on nutrition issues, but fail to translate this
into eﬀective action. Symbolic gesturing is however less likely
when an issue attracts signiﬁcant public attention; when citi-
zens’ tolerance for manipulation is low; or if the cultural
importance of saving face is high (Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000; Post
et al., 2010). Also, when made in the face of strong opposition
public statements suggest strength of conviction and commit-
ment (Morrissey, 1995). Conversely, the absence of a public
declaration does not imply there is no commitment.
Decision-makers weigh advantages and disadvantages prior
to declaring policy preferences, keeping in mind both the
administrative capacity to deliver the desired policies and the
identities and power of potential opponents (Hammergren,
1998; Morrissey, 1995; Morrissey & Verschoor, 2006). Part
of this involves understanding which actors’ “agreement or
indiﬀerence is necessary to change the status quo policy posi-
tion” (Tsebelis, 2002). 7
“Voluntary ownership” of a policy agenda (McCourt, 2003)
constitutes a second indicator of political commitment. In the
case of the nutrition agenda, Haddad (2013) notes that while
international commitment is currently high, it is often unclear
if this is truly reﬂected at the country level. Hence, are hunger
and nutrition policies a donor agenda foisted on developing
country governments, and/or do national policymakers and
politicians themselves see these as important problems to
address? The literature suggests that governments that experi-
ment and innovate with new policy approaches, and whose
spending on malnutrition is sensitive to electoral cycles and
to emergencies and disasters, signal “voluntary ownership”
(Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000). It can also be assessed in terms of the
locus of initiative for reforms: is a policy initiated and
(co-)designed by the ministry or department that is espousing
or implementing the change (Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000; Johnson &
Wasty, 1993)?
A third indicator of commitment is the “explicitness” with
which policy initiatives are presented. Do governments set
clear and realistically attainable policy goals, with speciﬁc tar-
gets? Where governments agree to put in place committees to
review policy change, do they also clearly commit themselves
to adopt their recommendations (McCourt, 2003)? Are allo-
cated budgets adequate for realistically addressing policy
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commitments but also can help to give nutrition visibility and
standing (Heaver, 2005; Post et al., 2010). Political party man-
ifestos provide critical guidance to the policy priorities of
(future) ruling governments and opposition (see e.g.,
Selbervik, 2006); their explicit incorporation of hunger and
nutrition as developmental problems therefore signal commit-
ment.
A fourth indicator of commitment is whether government
actions are “irrevocable”. Do governments put in place insti-
tutional mechanisms to raise the cost of policy reversal and
lend credibility to their policy reforms (Campos & Esfahani,
2000)? For instance, enshrining reforms in statutory law or
signing up to international agreements provide barriers
against policy reversal, whereas delegation of powers can cre-
ate bureaucratic constituencies that maintain support for the
reform (Taliercio, 2004). Budget spending can be assessed
for its adequacy in achieving policy goals. Clear budget lines
and transparent ﬁnancial mechanisms for earmarked hunger
and nutrition funding are important accountability tools that
can make spending promises harder to renege on. Discrepan-
cies between budget requests and allocations, and between
allocations and actual spending also signal levels of commit-
ment (Heaver, 2005).
A further indicator of commitment is whether governments
actively “mobilise support” to build consensus, enhancing
their ability to implement policy initiatives (Brinkerhoﬀ,
2000; Johnson & Wasty, 1993). This may take the shape of
subduing or compensating political opponents for losses
incurred. Conversely, in cases where legislators or executives
anticipate signiﬁcant bureaucratic resistance at implementa-
tion but do nothing to constrain or placate key bureaucratic
actors, they may be intentionally undermining a policy initia-
tive (Post et al., 2010). Heaver (2005) stresses how account-
ability to a wide range of actors is needed to mobilize
support and develop greater commitment to nutrition. One
important component of mobilizing support is hence to ade-
quately allow representation of divergent interests in hunger
and nutrition policy development (Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000). Put
otherwise, building commitment involves reducing political
conﬂict (Morrissey, 1995).
Furthermore, commitment can be shown in terms of “ana-
lytical rigour”. That is, to what extent do governments under-
take in-depth assessments of the problem at hand, and
eﬀectively generate and use data to devise technically suitable
and politically feasible policy interventions (Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000;
Shiﬀman, 2007). Sustained support for a policy initiative also
requires eﬀective monitoring and evaluation systems to gener-
ate knowledge on policy delivery, adjustment, and policy
learning.
Moreover, tackling enduring challenges such as hunger and
undernutrition requires “continuity and capacity”. Political
will not only requires initiating, but also sustaining eﬀorts
and bearing associated costs in the face of opposition until
results are achieved (Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000; Heaver, 2005). As
such, governments that engage in “one-shot” eﬀorts at solving
a policy problem, or that openly support a policy but subse-
quently fail to adequately fund it, are showing low commit-
ment. A capable bureaucracy is essential for implementing
policy initiatives, including suﬃcient human and ﬁnancial
resources—a common concern in nutrition policy (Nisbett
et al., 2014; Pelletier et al., 2012). Moreover, a perceived lack
of administrative, technical, and strategic capacity to deliver
policy can constrain policy elites to voice their commitment
publicly (Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000; Hyden & Karlstro¨m, 1993;
Morrissey, 1995; Post et al., 2010). Strengthening and eﬀec-tively using the ﬁnancial and administrative capacities to deli-
ver policy initiatives, and enhancing administrative fairness,
competence, and eﬀectiveness (Taliercio, 2004) hence signal
commitment.
“Implementation” of policy initiatives and reforms consti-
tutes a critical area for assessing political commitment. The
strength and quality of implementation provides evidence of
prior commitment (McCourt, 2003; Morrissey, 1995; Post
et al., 2010; Taliercio, 2004). Feedback loops occur between
the results of implementation and the (re)generation of politi-
cal commitment to a policy initiative. Whereas strong imple-
mentation outcomes may strengthen resolve, weak outcomes
may undermine existing commitment. Strong relations
between spending and coverage of nutrition interventions sig-
nals high commitment, as is eﬀective support for horizontal
and vertical coordination mechanisms needed to deliver multi-
sectoral nutrition interventions (Heaver, 2005).
A ﬁnal commitment indicator concerns the extent to which
government bureaucracies provide “credible incentives” to
agencies and individual civil servants to deliver policy initia-
tives (Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000). Such incentives could relate to intrin-
sic motivations stemming from personal goals and values, and
extrinsic motivations such as performance targets and mile-
stones (Heaver, 2005). Committed governments therefore
would seek to institute credible incentive structures in agencies
that design and deliver hunger and nutrition policy to reward
good performance (e.g., through enhanced budgets, reputa-
tions, promotions) and conversely, to incur negative sanctions
in case of failure.
To sum up, we have identiﬁed nine indicators of political
commitment: “explicitness”; “irrevocability”; “voluntariness”;
“publicness”; “mobilising support”; “continuity and capac-
ity”; “analytical rigour”; “credible incentives”, and “imple-
mentation”. In the next section we present a method for
empirically assessing these indicators using primary data.4. METHODS
The most popular research instrument for commitment met-
rics drawing on primary data is the expert perception survey.
It has, for instance, been applied to assess political commit-
ment regarding health (Goldberg et al., 2012), HIV/AIDS
(USAID et al., 2003) and hunger and nutrition (Fox et al.,
2015; te Lintelo et al., 2011, 2013; te Lintelo, Haddad,
Lakshman et al., 2014). This paper reports on ﬁndings from
perception surveys conducted from July to October 2013 with
213 experts in ﬁve high-burden and Scaling Up Nutrition cam-
paign countries: Bangladesh, Malawi, Nepal, Tanzania, and
Zambia (Table 3.1).
The surveys were carried out by well instructed in-country
consultants, and overseen by partner organizations working
on hunger and nutrition issues. A careful selection of
experts based in each country was made to ensure represen-
tation from government, non-governmental organizations
(NGO) and/or civil society, the academic/research commu-
nity, and development partners. The consultants drew up
lists of potential experts, with inputs from partner organiza-
tions and the authors. In order to obtain insider perspec-
tives on political commitment, we endeavored to include
one-third of survey respondents from the government, and
achieved this in all countries except Zambia. Substantial
participation of government oﬃcials in the survey estab-
lished external legitimacy and facilitated dialog with govern-
ment actors on research ﬁndings. Table 3.2 provides an
overview of the sample of experts.
Table 3.1. Hunger and nutrition data related to children under 5 years of age in the sample countries
Country Wasting a Stunting a Under-weighta Source
Bangladesh 16 41 36 NIPORT, Mitra and Associates, and ICF International (2013)
Malawi 4 47 13 NSO and ICF Macro (2011)
Nepal 11 41 29 MOHP, New ERA and ICF International (2012)
Tanzania 5 42 16 NBS and ICF Macro (2011)
Zambia 5 45 15 CSO, MOH, Tropical Diseases Research Centre (TDRC),
University of Zambia, and Macro International Inc (2009)
a Percentage of children aged 0–59 months who are moderately or severely aﬀected by this.
Table 3.2. The distribution of the sample of experts
Bangladesh Malawi Nepal Tanzania Zambia Total
Government 14 20 15 15 8 72
NGO/civil society 10 18 9 12 14 63
Academia/research 10 10 6 6 4 36
Development partners 4 6 9 7 12 38
Other 2 - - - 2 4
Total 40 54 39 40 40 213
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tion, we involved experts representing health, nutrition, water
and sanitation, social protection, agriculture, local govern-
ment, and gender development sectors. Respondents partici-
pated on the basis of informed consent obtained beforehand.
Responses were anonymized and aggregated across the sample
in each country.
Thirty-ﬁve survey questions sought to elicit experts’ subjec-
tive opinions about various aspects of their country’s govern-
ment commitment to addressing hunger and nutrition.
Because the concept of food security is a subset of nutrition
security, before starting the survey, interviewers ascertained
that respondents were clear about the conceptual diﬀerences. 8
We then asked each survey question in Table 3.3 twice: once in
relation to hunger and then again in relation to nutrition. 9
Each question uses a 5-point Likert scale. An example of a
scale used in HANCI is: (1) Very strongly, (2) Strongly, (3)
So-so, (4) Weakly, and (5) Negligibly/not at all. Scales consis-
tently used lower numeric values to denote higher commit-
ment. 10 We converted the experts’ Likert scale-based
responses to percentage scales using the following transforma-
tion function:
x0i;q;c ¼
5 xi;q;c
4
 
 100:
where xi;q;c is the original Likert scale response by an expert,
i, for a question, q, in a country, c, and x0i;q;c is the correspond-
ing percentage-transformed scale. The percentage scale
allowed us to communicate ﬁndings to policy audiences in a
more intuitive manner. The transformed scales were used to
calculate mean scale for each question, q, in a country, c.
We also calculated mean scores at the indicator level. For both
calculations, missing values were dropped. For example, if an
indicator included two questions and one of the experts had
only answered the ﬁrst question, we drop his/her answer to
that particular question but include his/her answer to the sec-
ond question when calculating the indicator level mean score.
Mean scores, both at the question level and at the indicator
level, were estimated separately for hunger and for nutrition
in each country.
We use paired sample t-tests for each of the 35 questions
within the ﬁve countries to test our hypothesis that estimated
question level mean scores are not equal between hunger and
nutrition. More speciﬁcally, the paired t-test measures whetherthe diﬀerence between the mean score for hunger and the mean
score for nutrition is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Some
authors claim that the use of parametric analyses (such as
the t-test) for statistical testing of ordinal data (such as those
based on percentage-transformed Likert scales) leads to inac-
curacies, because the data are not normally distributed
(Jamieson, 2004). However, others like Norman (2010)
counter-argue that the suitability of parametric tests is condi-
tional only on the normality of sample means and not on the
normality of the data. They point out that even in cases where
the data are non-normal, the means thereof will have normal
distributions. Accordingly we proceed in the next section to
implement the analytic strategy noted above and test the
hypothesis that hunger and nutrition commitment are the
same using paired t-tests. However, we also analyze the sensi-
tivity of our results to the parametric nature of the analysis.
We do this by repeating the analysis using the Wilcoxon
(1945) signed sum test; the non-parametric version of the
paired sample t-test.
The methodology employed was driven by our purpose to
assess in-country political commitment. Expert perception sur-
veys are well suited for this but do not explain underlying rea-
sons for the data patterns detected. Moreover, we refrain from
using the data for cross-country comparisons. The problem is
one of measurement equivalence: survey questions are not nec-
essarily interpreted in the same manner across the geographi-
cal, social, and cultural set of locations studied here, thus
introducing systematic bias. Within a country however mea-
surement equivalence is assured.5. FINDINGS
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of survey ﬁndings for
each country. It presents mean scores calculated for three to
ﬁve questions (see column “Qs”) for each of the nine political
commitment indicators. For example, ﬁve questions are rele-
vant for the “explicitness” indicator. The count of tabulated
valid responses, “Valid”, varies mainly because of the unequal
number of questions for each indicator. We are more inter-
ested in the variability of valid responses due to missing values
which is highlighted in column “Valid/N” reporting valid
responses as a proportion of N, the total possible responses
for an indicator in a given country. The latter is the product
Table 3.3. The questions representing nine political commitment indicators
Explicitness
1. How well are the goals of improving (a) hunger and (b) nutrition outcomes expressed in development strategies/policies?
2. How well deﬁned are (a) hunger and (b) nutrition outcomes in policies?
3. How well deﬁned are (a) hunger and (b) nutrition outcomes in ruling political party/coalition manifestos?
4. To what extent are government policy preferences for addressing (a) hunger and (b) nutrition reﬂected in budget allocations?
5. In your opinion, how strong or weak would you, in general, characterize the national government’s absolute (in money terms) budget allocations on (a) hunger and
(b) nutrition?
Irrevocability
6. How well are budget lines related to (a) hunger and (b) nutrition developed in national budgets?
7. To what extent are government policy preferences for addressing (a) hunger and (b) nutrition reﬂected in its budget expenditures?
8. How well has the government developed transparent ﬁnancial mechanisms for earmarked (a) hunger and (b) nutrition funding?
9. In your opinion, how strong or weak would you, in general, characterize the national government’s absolute (in money terms) budget expenditures on (a) hunger and
(b) nutrition?
Voluntary ownership
10. To what extent are (a) hunger and (b) nutrition policies initiated by the government agency responsible for executing these? a
11. To what extent does the government experiment and innovate with new policy approaches in (a) hunger and (b) nutrition?
12. In your opinion, how sensitive are government budget expenditures on (a) hunger and (b) nutrition to electoral cycles?
13. In your opinion, how sensitive are government budget expenditures on (a) hunger and (b) nutrition to emergencies/disasters?
Publicness
14. What kind of a priority does the government give to (a) hunger and (b) nutrition?
15. How accessible is government policy on (a) hunger and (b) nutrition to public scrutiny?
16. How developed is presidential/prime ministerial leadership in the country on (a) hunger and (b) nutrition?
17. How convincing are public statements made by senior politicians at the national level in relation to (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? b
Mobilizing support
18. How well do agencies responsible for the design of (a) hunger and (b) nutrition policies build social/political support?
19. How well do agencies responsible for the implementation of (a) hunger and (b) nutrition policies build social/political support?
20. How well do policy/strategy decision-making bodies allow representation of divergent interests in the area of (a) hunger and (b) nutrition?
21. How successful are agencies in gathering support to overcome resistance from threatened interests of stakeholders in (a) hunger and (b) nutrition?
Continuity and capacity
22. To what extent does the government enhance administrative capacity to address (a) hunger and (b) nutrition?
23. To what extent does the government enhance ﬁnancial capacity to address (a) hunger and (b) nutrition?
24. To what extent does the government utilize administrative capacity to address (a) hunger and (b) nutrition?
25. To what extent does the government utilize ﬁnancial capacity to address (a) hunger and (b) nutrition?
Analytical rigor
26. How developed are government systems that generate knowledge and evidence for (a) hunger and (b) nutrition?
27. How likely are government policies to be adjusted when strong evidence suggests a change in course for (a) hunger and (b) nutrition?
Credible incentives
28. For national government agency/agencies in charge of designing (a) hunger and (b) nutrition policy, is achievement or failure to achieve public policy objectives
credibly rewarded or sanctioned?
29. For national government agency/agencies in charge of implementing (a) hunger and (b) nutrition policy, is achievement or failure to achieve public policy objectives
credibly rewarded or sanctioned?
30. For individuals within the national government agencies in charge of designing (a) hunger and (b) undernutrition policy, is achievement or failure to achieve public
policy objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned?
31. For individuals within the national government agencies in charge of implementing (a) hunger and (b) undernutrition policy, is achievement or failure to achieve
public policy objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned?
(continued on next page)
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286 WORLD DEVELOPMENTof the number of questions in an indicator and the number of
experts in a country. For example, N for “explicitness” in Ban-
gladesh is 200 = 40  5. Out of these 200 possible expert
responses 188 were valid which yields “Valid/N” value of
0.94 = 188/200.
Some salient features of the data revealed in Table 4.1 high-
light the following themes:
(1) response rates are strong overall, though are not even
for all commitment indicators. “Valid/N” for
“Publicness” is the weakest among all indicators in all
countries except Zambia;
(2) the response rate for hunger and nutrition is similar for
all indicators in all countries. It follows that experts who
answered a hunger-related question were also highly likely
to answer the corresponding question on nutrition, and vice
versa;
(3) on 35 (out of 45) occasions the mean for the indicator
of hunger commitment is higher than the corresponding
mean for nutrition;
(4) out of the remaining ten cases (where the hunger com-
mitment mean is lower than the nutrition commitment
mean), nine are in Nepal;
(5) on 11 occasions the median for hunger commitment is
higher than the median for nutrition commitment and the
reverse is true in none of the cases;
(6) within each of the countries, the range of mean scores
(in %) on commitment indicators vary substantially: in
Zambia (13.1–70.8); Tanzania (19.9–63.3); Nepal (40.9–
66.0); Malawi (39.8–73.7); and in Bangladesh (33.5–70.8).
This suggests that within countries, commitment-building
eﬀorts could focus on indicators with lower range scores.
We next take a more detailed look at the data. Figure 4.1
sets out mean scores on hunger and nutrition commitment
for 35 questions asked organized by indicators within each
country. All pairs of hunger-nutrition commitment averages
are plotted in the ﬁgure with an arrow connecting the two
averages. The arrows highlight whether there is a diﬀerence
between the mean scores and also the direction of that diﬀer-
ence. All right-pointing arrows indicate that hunger commit-
ment obtained a higher mean score (stronger commitment)
than nutrition commitment; the left-pointing ones indicate
the reverse. Upward-pointing arrows indicate that the two
means were identical.
Figure 4.1 also summarizes the results of the series of paired
t-tests carried out to establish whether the observed diﬀerences
are statistically signiﬁcant. A black dot placed against a
country-question combination along “T” in the horizontal
axis indicates that mean scores for hunger/nutrition commit-
ment are statistically diﬀerent at the 1% level of signiﬁcance.
Similarly, gray dots indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level; white
dots at the 10% level. Missing dots signify (1) that
hunger/nutrition mean scores are identical or (2) that they
are diﬀerent but the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The dots against “W” report the corresponding
Wilcoxon-signed sum test results and are color coded simi-
larly.
The t statistic results in Figure 4.1 indicate that evidence
from Bangladesh and Zambia provides the strongest support
for the assertion that hunger and nutrition commitment are
divergent phenomena. In Zambia, all commitment indicators
have at least one expert question with a t statistic signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. Out of 35 t-tests, 26 are signiﬁcant (26/35)
at the 5% level. 11 In Bangladesh 25/34 t-tests are signiﬁcant
and 8/9 commitment indicators have at least one expert ques-
tion with a t statistic signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Moreover, in
all of these 51 (26 + 25) cases, hunger commitment is stronger
Table 4.1. Summary statistics organized by country and indicator of political commitment
Indicators of commitment Qs Hunger Nutrition
Valid ValidN Mean SD Med. Valid
Valid
N . Mean SD Med.
Bangladesh Explicitness 5 188 0.94 68.4 22.7 75 186 0.93 55.6 23.4 50
Irrevocability 4 153 0.96 55.6 23.5 50 152 0.95 46.5 22.5 50
Voluntary ownership 4 129 0.81 66.5 23.8 75 134 0.84 57.1 23.3 50
Publicness 4 117 0.73 70.1 23.0 75 117 0.73 61.5 24.5 75
Mobilizing support 4 157 0.98 60.8 22.7 50 157 0.98 54.6 21.9 50
Continuity and capacity 4 153 0.96 56.4 21.4 50 154 0.96 46.6 22.0 50
Analytical rigor 2 80 1.00 61.6 21.0 50 80 1.00 55.0 20.8 50
Credible incentives 4 118 0.74 34.5 24.7 50 115 0.72 33.5 22.4 50
Implementation 4 118 0.74 55.7 22.2 50 126 0.79 48.4 23.2 50
Malawi Explicitness 5 249 0.92 73.7 25.9 75 255 0.94 59.1 30.8 50
Irrevocability 4 199 0.92 57.9 31.7 50 197 0.91 45.9 29.1 50
Voluntary ownership 4 192 0.89 71.0 27.0 75 167 0.77 61.3 30.0 50
Publicness 4 157 0.73 72.9 26.4 75 160 0.74 65.6 26.7 75
Mobilizing support 4 201 0.93 64.4 25.9 75 203 0.94 62.2 27.1 75
Continuity and capacity 4 209 0.97 60.3 25.5 50 213 0.99 55.4 24.6 50
Analytical rigor 2 107 0.99 59.1 28.4 75 102 0.94 59.3 28.3 63
Credible incentives 4 167 0.77 42.1 33.3 50 171 0.79 39.8 32.5 50
Implementation 4 185 0.86 60.2 24.4 75 169 0.78 58.7 25.7 50
Nepal Explicitness 5 174 0.89 50.6 22.6 50 179 0.92 52.7 24.2 50
Irrevocability 4 138 0.88 44.4 21.1 50 148 0.95 46.3 22.8 50
Voluntary ownership 4 133 0.85 53.0 24.5 50 147 0.94 56.6 24.9 50
Publicness 4 112 0.72 55.4 24.5 50 113 0.72 59.1 25.7 50
Mobilizing support 4 152 0.97 54.1 22.7 50 152 0.97 57.6 21.2 50
Continuity and capacity 4 152 0.97 45.4 18.1 50 152 0.97 47.4 18.0 50
Analytical rigor 2 75 0.96 51.7 19.9 50 76 0.97 52.6 19.4 50
Credible incentives 4 140 0.90 40.9 21.5 50 140 0.90 41.3 22.2 50
Implementation 4 123 0.79 52.5 17.9 50 143 0.92 54.1 17.9 50
Tanzania Explicitness 5 163 0.82 51.8 23.3 50 169 0.85 42.6 22.6 50
Irrevocability 4 148 0.93 36.8 19.7 25 151 0.94 30.1 20.1 25
Voluntary ownership 4 133 0.83 63.3 24.8 75 139 0.87 46.5 22.4 50
Publicness 4 119 0.74 54.0 25.0 50 119 0.74 48.7 27.0 50
Mobilizing support 4 153 0.96 46.1 21.1 50 155 0.97 44.2 22.4 50
Continuity and capacity 4 157 0.98 43.5 21.8 50 159 0.99 37.6 21.4 50
Analytical rigor 2 78 0.98 48.1 22.7 50 79 0.99 39.6 19.9 25
Credible incentives 4 152 0.95 20.4 20.4 25 153 0.96 19.9 19.5 25
Implementation 4 138 0.86 51.2 21.4 50 150 0.94 45.3 23.3 50
Zambia Explicitness 5 185 0.93 65.8 25.9 75 182 0.91 44.8 30.3 50
Irrevocability 4 150 0.94 54.0 26.9 50 146 0.91 35.3 25.9 25
Voluntary ownership 4 125 0.78 71.8 26.6 75 129 0.81 55.0 30.9 50
Publicness 4 154 0.96 47.7 34.6 50 151 0.94 38.2 31.8 50
Mobilizing support 4 157 0.98 58.6 23.8 50 157 0.98 51.4 25.0 50
Continuity and capacity 4 153 0.96 56.0 23.7 50 148 0.93 41.6 24.5 50
Analytical rigor 2 78 0.98 60.9 25.7 50 77 0.96 52.3 24.7 50
Credible incentives 4 127 0.79 13.8 22.3 0 131 0.82 13.1 24.8 0
Implementation 4 101 0.63 57.7 23.4 50 103 0.64 45.0 25.3 50
EQUATE AND CONFLATE: POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO HUNGER 287than nutrition commitment (as per mean scores). In the vast
majority of these cases (19/34 for Bangladesh and 23/35 for
Zambia) the t statistics are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, which
lends even stronger statistical support for these ﬁndings.
Tanzania and Malawi have the next highest number of sig-
niﬁcant t statistics with 21/34 and 15/34 statistics signiﬁcant at
the 5% level respectively. Here again we ﬁnd hunger commit-
ment to be stronger than nutrition commitment. In Tanzania
7/9 commitment indicators have at least one expert question
with a t statistic signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and in Malawi this
is 6/9.
Nepal has the lowest number of signiﬁcant t statistics with
6/34 signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Interestingly, pair-wise com-
parison of means in these six cases ﬁnds nutrition commitment
to be stronger than hunger commitment. Similar scoring pat-terns were found for 19 other questions, however the diﬀer-
ences were not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. At the
indicator level in Nepal, 4/9 commitment indicators have at
least one expert question with a t statistic signiﬁcant at the
5% level. 12
The question-by-question comparison of hunger and nutri-
tion commitment scores enables an assessment of how well
questions empirically ﬁt selected commitment indicators. For
example, if four expert questions are relevant for a given indi-
cator of commitment all four would be expected to score hun-
ger above nutrition or vice versa. If not, the basis for selection
of these questions to represent a given commitment indicator
will have to be considered empirically weak. Our data in this
respect show that in all instances where statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in hunger and nutrition commitment were found,
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Figure 4.1. Empirical characterization of political commitment to hunger and undernutrition. Mean scores for 34 (and in case of Zambia, 35) questions are
compared using arrows where the arrowheads point from nutrition scores to the corresponding hunger scores. The vertical axes show question numbers on the
right-hand side and indicators on the left. The questions are spelt out in more detail in Table 3.3. In addition to comparing the means (using arrows) the ﬁgure
also illustrates whether the estimated diﬀerences in mean scores are statistically signiﬁcant. Signiﬁcant t-test results are indicated by dots against the relevant
question along “T” in the horizontal axis. Similarly signiﬁcant Wilcoxon-signed rank sum test results are indicated by dots along “W”. The dots are uniformly
color coded where white (s) indicates signiﬁcance at 10% level; gray ( ) at 5% level; and black (d) at 1% level.
288 WORLD DEVELOPMENTall questions in a given indicator in a given country rank hun-
ger and nutrition commitment in the same order.
Further, ﬁndings fromWilcoxon signed rank sum test results
reported in Figure 4.1 conﬁrm the t-test-based results, nearly
one to one. Out of 171 country-question combinations that
were tested, only 15 yielded aWilcoxon test result that diverged
from the corresponding t-test result. Only in one case is this dif-
ference so strong that a t-test result rejecting the null hypothesis
at least at the 10% level was overturned when the test was done
using the Wilcoxon method where the latter test failed to reject
the null. It is clear that the core of the ﬁndings based on t-tests
do not change if instead we used Wilcoxon tests. We therefore
conclude that our results are not sensitive to whether paramet-
ric methods were used to arrive at those results.
The results in Figure 4.1 may be summarized as follows:
(1) in each of the ﬁve countries studied empirical levels of
government commitment to hunger reduction are shown
to diﬀer from commitment to nutrition;
(2) hunger commitment is stronger than nutrition commit-
ment in four of the countries: Bangladesh, Malawi,
Tanzania and Zambia;
(3) in contrast, in Nepal nutrition commitment scores are
statistically signiﬁcantly higher than hunger commitment,
at the 5% level, however only in six out of 35 questions;
(4) while ﬁndings for all political commitment indicators
support the assertion that government commitment
addressing hunger and nutrition is diﬀerent, the “credible
incentives” indicator oﬀers least support for this. These
incentives tend to be systemic, and not unique to those
parts of bureaucracies addressing hunger or nutrition;
(5) there is some empirical support for our allocation of
questions under speciﬁc political commitment indicators;
(6) the results are robust and are not sensitive to the para-
metric tests used.6. DISCUSSION
In this section we will situate these ﬁndings in the context of
the existing literature in a bid to understand them better and
to consider implications for donor organizations, civil society,
and governments who seek to enhance political commitment
to reduce hunger and nutrition.
This study measured expert perceptions of political commit-
ment, not actual political commitment. We interviewed respon-
dentswith professional expertise active in the ﬁeld of hunger and
nutrition, and living in the targeted countries, and having a
sound understanding of political and policy context. Respon-
dents reﬂected on their actual experiences ofmanifestedpolitical
commitment. We therefore propose that their perceptions of
commitment are likely to approximate actual commitment.
The ﬁrst key ﬁnding of our study is that empirically, hunger
reduction commitment exceeds nutrition commitment in
Malawi, Bangladesh, Tanzania, and Zambia, while somewhat
less strong evidence suggests the reverse is the case in Nepal.
Failure to acknowledge what are often superior levels of com-
mitment to hunger reduction within high-burden countries
may risk continuing historically inadequate prioritization of
non-food aspects of malnutrition (Heaver, 2005), to imperil
the achievement of key global or regional nutrition targets.
For instance, the African Union Malabo Declaration 2014
seeks to achieve 10% stunting levels by 2025 (African
Union., 2014), and World Health Assembly targets a 40%
reduction of the global number of stunted children under ﬁve
by 2025 (WHO, 2015).
The second key ﬁnding from the study is that within each
country, performance on the nine commitment indicators is
quite uneven. The survey thus oﬀers a diagnostic tool that
could help donors, civil society leaders, and nutrition champi-
ons to assess in which areas commitment is in need of strength-
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Figure 5.1. Stakeholder support for government action on hunger and nutrition. The expert assessment of support by various stakeholders and the statistical
signiﬁcance of the level of support between the hunger and nutrition divide is documented here. Notation, the choice of statistical tests, and the color codes used
in presenting the test results are identical to those used in Figure 4.1.
EQUATE AND CONFLATE: POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO HUNGER 289ening, and in which areas further strengthening may not be a
priority. Thus, in Bangladesh, “publicness” is gaining the
strongest scores in case of both nutrition and hunger, whereas
for Zambia scores on this indicator lag behind other commit-
ment indicators. Nevertheless, we also see some commonalities
across countries. First, experts consistently allocated weakest
commitment scores to “credible incentives”. Reforms toward
more credible incentives in bureaucracies are not speciﬁc to
nutrition and hunger; they are systemic and exemplify the
impossibility of strengthening commitment overnight
(Heaver, 2005). Second, “irrevocability” and “continuity and
capacity” emerge as other indicators on which scores are rela-
tively poor in each country. In particular, expert scores high-
light the need to anchor nutrition budget lines in national
budgets; to substantially increase funding for nutrition in order
to deliver government policy preferences; and the importance of
developing more transparent ﬁnancial mechanisms. These
ﬁndings aﬃrm concerns in the literature that highlight
under-investment in care, hygiene, and health aspects of nutri-
tion (Heaver, 2005). A recent assessment of 20 countries’ bud-
gets for programmes tackling the underlying and basic causes
of malnutrition concludes that themajority of funding supports
food security programing with much smaller amounts spent on
nutrition-related health and water and sanitation activities, and
even smaller sums support improving the care environment
(SUN, 2014). More so, our ﬁndings reﬂect weak ﬁnancial and
administrative capacities to deliver nutrition interventions;
unevenness in public information on national nutrition bud-
get allocations and the poor tracking of domestic investments
in nutrition. This is also borne out by the fact that only three
out of 51 Scaling Up Nutrition countries track domestic invest-
ments (Fracassi & Picanyol, 2014). In terms of the strongest
commitment scores we witness greater variation across indica-
tors in countries. In case of nutrition commitment, “publicness”
received strongest scores in all countries exceptZambia, and this
indicator also obtains strongest scores inNepal and Bangladesh
for hunger commitment. This broadly aﬃrms the ﬁnding from
Pelletier et al. (2012) that while some governments do publicly
speak out, committed action that delivers on nutrition is not
as pronounced. For Tanzania and Zambia, “voluntary owner-
ship” obtains the strongest scores, and in Malawi the “explicit-
ness” indicator performs best for hunger commitment.
Several factors may explain diﬀerent hunger and nutrition
commitment scores. In many countries, political elites com-
monly appreciate that containing extreme hunger is germane
to political survival. As a former president of Nigeria noted:
“A hungry person is an angry and dangerous person”
(Obasanjo, 2005). Moreover, hunger commitment is founda-tional in some countries; Bangladesh’s independence occurred
on the back of famine. Despite prominent recent statements
by, for instance, Tanzania’s President Jakaya Kikwete and
India’s former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declaring
undernutrition as a “national disaster” or a “national shame”
respectively, historically non-food aspects of nutrition have
not been as politicized as hunger. There is also a risk that sym-
bolic politics thrive when reputational costs for unfulﬁlled
public statements are low (Post et al., 2010) and the lack of
popular demand for action on nutrition is indicative. One
aspect of our survey (not reported above) explored who sup-
ports government action on hunger and undernutrition (Fig-
ure 5.1). In all countries except Nepal, general publics are
statistically signiﬁcantly more supportive toward government
eﬀorts on hunger than nutrition. Furthermore, public support
is often lagging behind donor support, raising questions about
the sustainability of donor agendas.
For communities, malnutrition is usually invisible, and nei-
ther they nor governments tend to recognize its human and
economic costs (Haddad, 2013; Heaver, 2005). Malnourished
people, unlike hungry people, hence are less inclined to
demand government action, and less likely to vote or rebel
for change. We thus ﬁnd that nutrition budgets are much less
sensitive to electoral cycles then hunger budgets (question 12
in Figure 4.1).
Achieving greater nutrition commitment is also hindered by
low levels of awareness or knowledge, institutional complex-
ity, and limited managerial capacity, and diﬀering political
or bureaucratic-political interests (Heaver, 2005). Like the
general public, decision-makers often have low awareness
about the multiple causes, manifestations, and consequences
of malnutrition. Moreover, improving nutrition outcomes
requires multisectoral action but this is often constrained by
weak incentives for collaboration across sectors (Haddad,
2013) and conﬂicting bureaucratic interests. Further,
approaches to nutrition have also long been dominated by
food- or disease-based models that emphasized technocratic
solutions, neglecting political economy and policy
process-related causes (Heaver, 2005; Nisbett et al., 2014;
Pelletier, Deneke, Kidane, Haile, & Negussie, 1995; Pelletier
et al., 2012).
Given these ﬁndings, what strategies could improve nutri-
tion commitment? Hyden and Karlstro¨m (1993) suggest that
interventions by donors, civil society, and governments should
consider two dimensions: “conﬂict” and “ambiguity”. The
former represents the extent of political opposition that inter-
ventions are likely to elicit, while the latter represents the
learning required to implement these, in terms of complexity
290 WORLD DEVELOPMENTand range of organizations involved (Morrissey, 1995). As
compared to nutrition, anti-hunger interventions beneﬁt from
higher levels of consensus, lower complexity and a smaller
range of organizations are likely to be involved. Under such
conditions, well-resourced technical solutions (Hyden &
Karlstro¨m, 1993, p. 1401) could address hunger, for instance
by raising agricultural productivity and rural incomes. How-
ever, a diﬀerent strategy may be needed for better nutrition
outcomes. As long as nutrition remains under-politicized,
eﬀorts could focus on strengthening capacity (Hyden &
Karlstro¨m, 1993), before wide-ranging nutrition reforms are
undertaken (Morrissey, 1995, p. 640). Our expert survey ﬁnd-
ings also highlight the need for capacity building. The capac-
ity of implementing organizations may be built by
appropriately motivating staﬀ and encouraging clients to use
and monitor nutrition services (Heaver, 2005). An incremental
approach, strategically using small-scale programmes rather
than comprehensive reforms, can demonstrate improved
nutrition outcomes, which in turn can generate commitment
to do more and enhance the capacity for attempting subse-
quent complex reforms (Heaver, 2005; Morrissey, 1995).
Small aid donors or foundations lacking resources to ﬁnance
direct intervention programmes at scale could aim to persuade
governments to seek additional development assistance and
allocate more of their own resources for nutrition (Heaver,
2005). Such an approach would also address long-term nutri-
tion ﬁnancing needs: aid funds for nutrition intervention pro-
grammes will always be a small proportion of what
developing-country governments contribute (Heaver, 2005;
IFPRI, 2014). However, without increased understanding of
the manifestations and consequences of malnutrition among
political leaders, senior bureaucrats, civil society leaders, com-
munities and parents, the sustained demand for greater action
on nutrition will remain muted.7. CONCLUSION
Academic and policy literatures as well as dominant narra-
tives on nutrition in development have long had a tendency to
conﬂate hunger with undernutrition, and food security with
nutrition security (Nisbett et al., 2014; World Bank, 2006).
This suggests that commitment metrics, which have gained
popularity in recent years, should be sensitive to these diﬀer-ences. This article accordingly aimed to empirically assess
whether perceived government commitment to hunger reduc-
tion is the same as perceived commitment to addressing under-
nutrition. We synthesized the political commitment literature
to identify nine commitment indicators, to build a survey
instrument, and test the hypothesis that governments are as
equally committed to hunger reduction as to improving under-
nutrition. Structured surveys were conducted face-to-face with
213 experts in ﬁve developing countries, each with high bur-
dens of hunger and undernutrition: Bangladesh, Malawi,
Nepal, Tanzania, and Zambia.
We ﬁnd that in each case study country commitment to hun-
ger reduction is not the same as commitment to nutrition, and
paired t-tests show that these diﬀerences are frequently statis-
tically signiﬁcant. In Bangladesh, Malawi, Tanzania, and
Zambia we ﬁnd substantial evidence that hunger reduction
commitment exceeds nutrition commitment. In Nepal, evi-
dence is less pronounced but suggests that nutrition commit-
ment surpasses hunger commitment. We thus aﬃrm our
hypothesis that government commitment to hunger reduction
does not equate with commitment to nutrition and propose
that commitment metrics are sensitive to these diﬀerences in
order to better guide public policy and programmatic action.
The expert perception survey tool we presented oﬀers a diag-
nostic for governments, donors, civil society leaders, and
nutrition champions to assess in which areas commitment is
in need of being strengthened, and in which areas further
strengthening may not be a priority. Our work with civil soci-
ety groups, members of parliament, and governments in Tan-
zania and Zambia has highlighted that survey ﬁndings are
highly relevant to policy dialogs and advocacy. This is because
empirical data on the nine commitment indicators are rare,
grounded in local realities and credible thanks to the balanced
approach to respondent selection. Longitudinal application of
this low-cost survey tool could thus help to track temporal
progress in delivering committed hunger and nutrition action
on the ground. The commitment metric developed in this
paper is a ﬁrst, imperfect eﬀort. We anticipate improving the
survey instrument to more precisely disentangle commitment
to food aspects from commitment to the care, hygiene, and
health aspects of nutrition security, and to use vignette tech-
niques to enable cross-country comparisons.NOTES1. “Undernutrition refers to poor growth, manifest as low weight for
height (wasting), low height for age (stunting), or low weight for age
(underweight) due to a combination of deﬁcits of food, care, water and
sanitation, and health services” (Foresight, 2011, footnote 3). FAO,
IFAD, and WFP (2014, p. 50) considers undernutrition to be the
“outcome of undernourishment, and/or poor absorption, and/or poor
biological use of nutrients consumed as a result of repeated infectious
disease. It includes being underweight for one’s age, too short for one’s age
(stunted), dangerously thin for one’s height (wasted), and deﬁcient in
vitamins and minerals (micronutrient malnutrition)” FAO (2014, p. 50).
2. For instance, a recent regression model shows how over the period
1970–2010 enhanced access to safe water and sanitation contributed to
38.6% of all stunting reduction achieved globally (Smith & Haddad, 2015).
3. We use these terms interchangeably.
4. For instance, Post et al. (2010, p. 659) deﬁne political will as “the
extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particularpolicy solution to a particular problem.” In contrast, McCourt (2003)
considers common dictionary deﬁnitions, such as a “pledge or an
undertaking”, suﬃcient to start conceptually unpacking commitment.5. These studies typically identify three major explanatory factors for the
(lack of) emergence of political commitment. Firstly, the characteristics of
the policy issue at stake. For instance, Shiﬀman and Smith note that
“problems that cause substantial harm, as indicated by objective measures
such as numbers of deaths, are more likely to attract resources than are
those that do not” (2007, p. 1372). In contrast, the invisibility of
malnutrition for individuals, communities, and governments leads them to
discount human and economic costs of malnutrition and under-prioritize
demand for nutrition services (Heaver, 2005). Secondly, institutional
characteristics of the polity and policy subsystems aﬀect the creation of
political commitment. These comprise for instance: the democratic or
autocratic nature of the political regime; the roles of key institutions such
as the presidency and parliament in policymaking; and the relations
between scales of government involved in designing and delivering policies
EQUATE AND CONFLATE: POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO HUNGER 291(e.g., Brinkerhoﬀ, 2000; Post et al., 2010). Also, multisectoral policy
interventions require much learning within bureaucracies and more easily
generate opposition to implementation than those that do not (Hyden &
Karlstro¨m, 1993). Thirdly, the conﬁgurations and characteristics of key
actors within hunger and nutrition policy subsystems play an important
role in driving commitment (e.g., Shiﬀman & Smith, 2007). Characteristics
include leadership, power, interests, values, beliefs, and motivations. For
instance, actors can consider interventions addressing hunger as the right,
the beneﬁcial, or the “commonsensical” thing to do. Given that
motivations diﬀer, a certain level of consensus is needed in order for
political commitment to become manifest (Hyden & Karlstro¨m, 1993;
McCourt, 2003; Post et al., 2010). A “suﬃcient set” of political leaders,
policy elites, and implementers thus need to agree (i) that a particular issue
has reached problem status; (ii) on the nature of the problem; and (iii) that
the problem requires government action (Post et al., 2010). Furthermore,
they need to ﬁnd eﬀective ways of framing and expressing these
preferences to gain the attention of the general public, and of political
and bureaucratic leaders to generate traction in policy agenda-setting
forums (cf., Chong and Druckman, 2007).
6. Some commitment metrics employ primary data, notably HRCI,
HANCI, while the Political Commitment Rapid Assessment Tool
(PCOM-RAT) awaits ﬁeld-testing.
7. Veto players may be located in both formal and informal political
institutions, as shown by McCourt’s (2003) study of failed economic
reforms in Swaziland, where traditional forms of authority overrode
democratically elected leadership.8. Respondents were instructed to understand hunger as having
food-based causes and being about levels of food intake insuﬃcient for
an individual to meet dietary energy requirements. Undernutrition was
clariﬁed as caused by a combination of food and non-food causes such as
deﬁcits of food, care, water and sanitation, and health services and being
about poor growth, for instance demonstrated by stunting or wasting.
9. Whereas the double burden of malnutrition (under and over-nutrition)
is a growing concern in all of our countries, and political commitment
against both aspects is of importance, this research focused on undernu-
trition and hunger.
10. Three other 5-point scales were used: (a) Very important, Important,
So-so, Unimportant, and Very unimportant; (b) Very clearly, Clearly,
Somewhat, Unclearly, and Very unclearly; and (c) Strongly developed,
Developed, Somewhat, Poorly developed, and Non-existent. “Don’t
know” and “refrain to answer” responses were re-coded as missing values
before calculating the mean scores.
11. Zambia has data for one additional question, question 17.
12. Whereas this study is not designed to explain why these results show
for the countries we note that Nepal has seen remarkable improvements in
stunting outcomes over the last decades and is one of a select group of
low-income countries succeeding in achieving Millennium Development
Goals on maternal mortality.
NCES
demonstrated in PRSP, UNDAF and through nutrition governance.REFEREActionAid. (2009). Who’s really ﬁghting hunger – Action aid’s Hunger-
FREE scorecard investigates why a billion people are hungry.
Retrieved July 9, 2015, from <http://www.actionaid.org/>.
ActionAid. (2010). Who’s really ﬁghting hunger – Why the world is going
backwards on the UN goal to halve hunger and what can be done.
Retrieved July 9, 2015, from <http://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/
default/ﬁles/doc_lib/hungerfree_scorecard.pdf>.
African Union. (2014). Malabo declaration on accelerated agricultural
growth and transformation for shared prosperity and improved
livelihoods. Retrieved June 23, 2015, from <http://caadp.net/>.
Bhutta, Z. A., Ahmed, T., Black, R. E., Cousens, S., Dewey, K.,
Giugliani, E., et al. (2008). Maternal and child undernutrition 3 – What
works? Interventions for maternal and child undernutrition and
survival. Lancet, 371(9610), 417–440. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
s0140-6736(07)61693-6.
Black, R. E., Victora, C. G., Walker, S. P., Bhutta, Z. A., Christian, P., de
Onis, M., et al. (2013). Maternal and child nutrition 1 – Maternal and
child undernutrition and overweight in low-income and middle-income
countries. Lancet, 382(9890), 427–451. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
s0140-6736(13)60937-x.
Brinkerhoﬀ, D. W. (2000). Assessing political will for anti-corruption
eﬀorts: An analytic framework. Public Administration and Develop-
ment, 20(3), 239–252, 10.1002/1099-162X(200008)20:3<239::AID-
PAD138>3.0.CO;2-3.
Campos, J. E., & Esfahani, H. S. (2000). Credible commitment and
success with public enterprise reform. World Development, 28(2),
221–243. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0305-750x(99)00128-x.
CSO MOH Tropical Diseases Research Centre (TDRC) University of
Zambia & Macro International Inc (2009). Zambia demographic and
health survey 2007. Calverton, Maryland, USA: Central Statistical
Oﬃce (CSO), Ministry of Health (MOH), Tropical Diseases Research
Centre (TDRC), University of Zambia, and Macro International Inc.
CFS. (2011). Final Report - thirty seventh session. Committee on World
Food Security, FAO. Retrieved from <http://www.fao.org/cfs/en/>.
CFS. (2012). Coming to terms with terminology. Retrieved July 9, 2015,
from <http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/026/MD776E.pdf>.
Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). Framing theory. Annual Review of
Political Science, 10, 103–126.
Engesveen, K., Nishida, C., Prudhon, C., & Shrimpton, R. (2009).
Assessing countries’ commitment to accelerate nutrition actionSCN News, 37, 10–16.
FAO IFAD & WFP (2013). The state of food insecurity in the world 2013.
The multiple dimensions of food security. Rome: Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO).
FAO IFAD & WFP (2014). The state of food insecurity in the world 2014.
Strengthening the enabling environment for food security and nutrition.
Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
FAO. (2012). Reviewed Strategic Framework and outline of the Medium
Term Plan 2014–17. Retrieved July 9, 2015, from <http://www.fao.
org/docrep/meeting/026/me999e.pdf>.
Foresight (2011). Synthesis report C11: Ending hunger. London: Foresight
Project on Global Food and Farming Futures.
Fox, A. M., Balarajan, Y., Cheng, C., & Reich, M. R. (2015). Measuring
political commitment and opportunities to advance food and nutrition
security: Piloting a rapid assessment tool. Health Policy and Planning,
30(5), 566–578. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/heapol/czu035.
Fracassi, P., & Picanyol, C. (2014). Tracking government investments for
nutrition at country level. Retrieved July 9, 2015, from <http://
scalingupnutrition.org/>.
Gillespie, S., Haddad, L., Mannar, V., Menon, P., & Nisbett, N. (2013).
The politics of reducing malnutrition: Building commitment and
accelerating impact. The Lancet, 382(9891), 552–569. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)60842-9.
Goldberg, A. B., Fox, A. M., Gore, R. J., & Ba¨rnighausen, T. (2012).
Indicators of political commitment to respond to HIV. Sexually
Transmitted Infections, 88(2), 79–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/sex-
trans-2011-050221.
Haddad, L. (2013). How can we build an enabling political environment to
ﬁght undernutrition?. European Journal of Development Research,
25(1), 13–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2012.45.
Hammergren, L. (1998). Political will, constituency building, and public
support in rule of law programs (No. PN-ACD-023). Center for
Democracy and Governance, USAID.
Heaver, R. (2005). Strengthening country commitment to human develop-
ment: Lessons from nutrition. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Hunger Task Force. (2008). Report to the Government of Ireland.
Retrieved July 9, 2015, from <https://www.irishaid.ie/media/irishaid/
allwebsitemedia/20newsandpublications/publicationpdfsenglish/hun-
ger-task-force.pdf>.
292 WORLD DEVELOPMENTHyden, G., & Karlstro¨m, B. (1993). Structural adjustment as a policy
process – The case of Tanzania.World Development, 21(9), 1395–1404.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0305-750x(93)90120-x.
IFPRI. (2014). Global nutrition report 2014: Actions and accountability to
accelerate the world’s progress on nutrition. Washington: International
Food Policy Research Institute.
Jamieson, S. (2004). Likert scales: How to (ab)use them. Medical
Education, 38(12), 1217–1218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-
2929.2004.02012.x.
Jarosz, L. (2011). Deﬁning world hunger. Food, Culture & Society, 14(1),
117–139. http://dx.doi.org/10.2752/175174411X12810842291308.
Johnson, J. H., & Wasty, S. S. (1993). Borrower ownership of adjustment
programs and the political economy of reform (No. 0821324705).
Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.
McCourt, W. (2003). Political commitment to reform: Civil service reform
in Swaziland.World Development, 31(6), 1015–1031. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/S0305-750X(03)00044-5.
Mejia Acosta, A., & Haddad, L. (2014). The politics of success in the ﬁght
against malnutrition in Peru. Food Policy, 44, 26–35. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.foodpol.2013.10.009.
Mejia-Acosta, A., & Fanzo, J. (2012). Fighting maternal and child
malnutrition: Analysing the political and institutional determinants of
delivering a national multisectoral response in six countries. Brighton:
Institute of Development Studies.
MOHP, New ERA, & ICF International. (2012). Nepal Demographic and
Health Survey 2011. Kathmandu, Nepal, Calverton, Maryland:
Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP) [Nepal], New ERA,
and ICF International.
Morrissey, O. (1995). Political commitment, institutional capacity and tax
policy reform in Tanzania. World Development, 23(4), 637–649. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/0305-750x(94)00148-r.
Morrissey, O., & Verschoor, A. (2006). What does ownership mean in
practice?. In A. Paloni, & M. Zanardi (Eds.), The IMF, World Bank
and policy reform (pp. 266–280). London: Routledge.
NBS & ICF Macro (2011). Tanzania demographic and health survey 2010.
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)
[Tanzania] and ICF Macro.
NIPORT Mitra and Associates & ICF International (2013). Bangladesh
demographic and health survey 2011. Dhaka, Bangladesh and
Calverton, Maryland, USA: National Institute of Population
Research and Training (NIPORT), Mitra and Associates, and ICF
International.
Nisbett, N., Gillespie, S., Haddad, L., & Harris, J. (2014). Why
worry about the politics of childhood undernutrition?. World
Development, 64, 420–433. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.world-
dev.2014.06.018.
Norman, G. (2010). Likert scales, levels of measurement and the “laws” of
statistics. Advances in Health Sciences Education, 15(5), 625–632.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10459-010-9222-y.
NSO & ICF Macro (2011). Malawi demographic and health survey 2010.
Zomba, Malawi, and Calverton, Maryland, USA: National Statistical
Oﬃce (NSO) and ICF Macro.
Obasanjo, O. (2005). Poverty’s handmaiden. Retrieved July 9, 2015, from
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/23/g8>.
Pelletier, D. L., Deneke, K., Kidane, Y., Haile, B., & Negussie, F. (1995).
The food-ﬁrst bias and nutrition policy – Lessons from Ethiopia. Food
Policy, 20(4), 279–298. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0306-9192(95)00026-
7.
Pelletier, D. L., Frongillo, E. A., Gervais, S., Hoey, L., Menon, P., Tien,
N., et al. (2012). Nutrition agenda setting, policy formulation and
implementation: Lessons from the Mainstreaming Nutrition Initiative.
Health Policy and Planning, 27(1), 19–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/
heapol/czr011.
Post, L. A., Raile, A. N., & Raile, E. D. (2010). Deﬁning political will.
Politics & Policy, 38(4), 653–676.Save the Children & World Vision International (2012). The nutrition
barometer: Gauging national responses to undernutrition. London: Save
the Children (STC) and World Vision International (WVI).
Selbervik, H. (2006). PRSP in Tanzania: Do Mkukuta and the CCM
election manifesto pull in the same direction? (No. R 2006: 9). Bergen,
Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute.
Shiﬀman, J. (2007). Generating political priority for maternal mortality
reduction in 5 developing countries. American Journal of Public Health,
97(5), 796–803. http://dx.doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2006.095455.
Shiﬀman, J., & Smith, S. (2007). Generation of political priority for global
health initiatives: A framework and case study of maternal mortality.
Lancet, 370(9595), 1370–1379. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0140-
6736(07)61579-7.
SUN. (2013). Compendium of SUN Country ﬁches. New York: Scaling Up
Nutrition.
SUN (2014). Planning and costing for the acceleration of actions for
nutrition: Experiences of countries in the Movement for Scaling Up
Nutrition. New York: Scaling Up Nutrition.
Smith, L. C., & Haddad, L. (2015). Reducing child undernutrition: Past
drivers and priorities for the post-MDG era. World Development, 68,
180–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.11.014.
Taliercio, R. R. Jr., (2004). Administrative reform as credible commit-
ment: The impact of autonomy on revenue authority performance in
Latin America. World Development, 32(2), 213–232. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.worlddev.2003.08.008.
te Lintelo, D. J. H., Haddad, L. J., Lakshman, R., & Gatellier, K. (2013).
The Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI 2012): Mea-
suring the political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition in
developing countries (Evidence report no. 25). Brighton.
te Lintelo, D. J. H., Haddad, L. J., Lakshman, R., & Gatellier, K. (2014).
The Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI 2013):
Measuring the political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition
in developing countries (Evidence report no. 78). Brighton: Institute of
Development Studies (IDS).
te Lintelo, D. J. H., Haddad, L. J., Leavy, J., & Lakshman, R. (2014).
Measuring the commitment to reduce hunger: A hunger reduction
commitment index. Food Policy, 44, 115–128.
te Lintelo, D. J. H., Haddad, L. J., Leavy, J., Masset, E., & Stanley, A.
(2011). Measuring the commitment to reduce hunger: The hunger
reduction commitment index. Brighton: Institute of Development
Studies, Retrieved from <http://www.hancindex.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2011/09/hrci-ﬁnal-report-for-web-draft.pdf>.
The Policy Project. (2000). HIVAIDS Toolkit – Building political
commitment through broadening participation in the policy process.
Retrieved July 9, 2015, from <http://www.policyproject.com/
pubs/bookpurple.pdf>.
Thomas, J. W., & Grindle, M. S. (1990). After the decision: Implementing
policy reforms in developing countries. World Development, 18(8),
1163–1181. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(90)90096-G.
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions work. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.
UNICEF. (2014). The state of the world’s children 2014 in numbers:
Every child counts. Retrieved July 9, 2015, from <http://www.unicef.
org/sowc2014/numbers/>.
USAID, UNAIDS, WHO, & Project, T. P. (2003). The level of eﬀort in the
national response to HIV/AIDS: the AIDS program eﬀort index (API)
2003 round. Retrieved from <https://www.globalhivmeinfo.org/
DigitalLibrary/Digital%20Library/AIDSProgramEﬀortIndex.pdf>.
WHO. (2015). Global targets 2025: Poster. Retrieved June 23, 2015,
from <http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/nutrition_globaltarget-
s2025/en/>.
Wilcoxon, F. (1945). Individual comparisons by ranking methods.
Biometrics Bulletin, 1(6), 80–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3001968.
World Bank (2006). Repositioning nutrition as central to development: A
strategy for large-scale action. Washington, DC: World Bank.ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
